We generalize the "No-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) to the infinite case.
Introduction
Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than to the lack of information. It is natural to presume that asymmetric unawareness may lead to speculative trade. Indeed, in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we present a simple example of speculation under unawareness in which there is common certainty of willingness to trade but agents have a strict preference to trade despite the existence of a common prior.
1 This is impossible in standard state-space structures with a common prior. In standard "No Trade" theorems, if there is common certainty of willingness to trade, then agents are necessarily indifferent to trade (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) . Somewhat surprising, in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we also prove a "No-trade" result according to which under a common prior there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. This means that arbitrary small transaction costs rule out speculation under asymmetric unawareness. The "No-trade" result in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) has been stated for finite unawareness belief structures. In this note we generalize the result to infinite unawareness belief structures. Such a generalization is relevant since the space of underlying uncertainties may be large. Especially if it is large, agents may be unaware of some of them. Moreover, the generalization serves as a robustness check for our "Notrade" result for finite unawareness belief structures. It shows that the result in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) is not an artefact of the finiteness assumption but holds more generally.
Topological Unawareness Belief Structures
We consider an unawareness belief structure as defined in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) but with additional topological properties.
Compact Hausdorff State-Spaces
Let S = {S α } α∈A be a complete lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order on S. If S α and S β are such that S α S β we say that "S α is more expressive than S β -states of S α describe situations with a richer vocabulary than states of S β ". 2 (S, ) is well-founded, that is, every non-empty subset X ⊆ S contains a -minimal element.
(That is, there is a S ∈ X such that for all S ∈ X : if S S , then S = S .) Each statespace S ∈ S is a non-empty compact Hausdorff space with a Borel σ-field F S . Denote by Ω = α∈A S α the union of these spaces. Ω is endowed with the disjoint-union topology:
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less "rich" in terms of facts that may or may not obtain in them. The partial order relates to the "richness" of spaces. The upmost space of the lattice may be interpreted as the "objective" state-space. Its states encompass full descriptions.
Continuous Projections
For every S and S such that S S, there is a continuous surjective projection r S S : S → S, where r S S is the identity. ("r S S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the more limited vocabulary of S.") Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of S . We require the projections to commute: If S S S then r
Projections "translate" states in "more expressive" spaces to states in "less expressive" spaces by "erasing" facts that can not be expressed in a lower space. An event is a pair (E, S), where E = D ↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E = ∅, then S is uniquely determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅ S for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Ω is an event.
Events
Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also "expressible" in "more expressive" spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular subset but also its inverse images in "more expressive" spaces.
Let Σ be the set of measurable events of Ω, i.e., D ↑ such that D ∈ F S , for some state-space S ∈ S. Note that unless S is a singleton, Σ is not an algebra because it contains distinct ∅ S for all S ∈ S. 
Negation
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D ↑ is both expressible and valid -these are the states in D ↑ ; there may be states in which its description is expressible but invalid -these are the states in ¬D ↑ ; and there may be states in which neither its description nor its negation are expressible -these are the states in
Conjunction and Disjunction
is a finite or countable collection of events (with
Note, that since S is a complete lattice, sup λ∈L S λ exists. If S = sup λ∈L S λ , then
Again, abusing notation, we write
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol ∩ interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S S. If E = ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅ S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) if and only if S S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ) as long as we keep in mind that in the case of E = ∅ S we have ∅ S ⊆ F if and only if S S(F ). It follows from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ). Note, that by these definitions, the conjunction and disjunction of (at most countably many measurable) events is a (measurable) event.
Apart from the topological conditions, the event-structure outlined so far is analogous to Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2009 ).
Regular Borel Probability Measures
Here and in what follows, the term 'events' always means measurable events in Σ unless otherwise stated.
For each S ∈ S, ∆ (S) is the set of regular Borel probability measures on (S, F S ). We consider this set itself as a measurable space which is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. where O ⊆ S is open and r ∈ R (see e.g. Billingsley (1968) , appendix III). When S is Normal (and in particular compact and/or metric), this topology coincides with the weak * topology -the weakest topology for which the mapping
is continuous for every continuous real-valued function f on S.
S∈S ∆(S) is endowed with the disjoint-union topology: O ∆ ⊆ S∈S ∆(S) is open if and only if O ∆ ∩ ∆(S) is open in ∆(S) for all S ∈ S.
Note that although each S and each ∆(S) are compact, if S is infinite, Ω and S∈S ∆(S) are not compact.
Marginals
For a probability measure µ ∈ ∆ (S ), the marginal µ |S of µ on S S is defined by
Let S µ be the space on which µ is a probability measure. Whenever S µ S(E) then we abuse notation slightly and write
If S(E) S µ , then we say that µ(E) is undefined.
Continuous Type Mappings
Let I be a nonempty finite or countable set of individuals. For every individual, each state gives rise to a probabilistic belief over states in some space.
Definition 1 For each individual i ∈ I there is a continuous type mapping
We require the type mapping t i to satisfy the following properties:
(2) If S S S, ω ∈ S , and t i (ω) ∈ (S ) then t i (ω S ) = t i (ω) |S .
(3) If S S S, ω ∈ S , and t i (ω S ) ∈ (S) then S t i (ω) S.
described with the same "vocabulary" -the "vocabulary" available to the individual at ω. This "vocabulary" may be less expressive than the "vocabulary" used to describe statements in the state ω."
Properties (1) to (3) compare the types of an individual in a state ω and its projection to ω S . Property (1) and (2) mean that at the projected state ω S the individual believes everything she believes at ω given that she is aware of it at ω S . Property (3) means that at ω an individual can not be unaware of an event that she is aware of at the projected state ω S .
This is the set of states at which individual i's type or the marginal thereof coincides with her type at ω. Such sets are events in our structure:
Remark 1 For any ω ∈ Ω, Ben i (ω) is an S t i (ω) -based event, which is not necessarily measurable. 3 A Generalized "No-Trade" Theorem Definition 3 (Prior) A prior for player i is a system of probability measures P i = P S i S∈S ∈ S∈S ∆(S) such that 4 The name "Ben" is chosen analogously to the "ken" in knowledge structures. 5 Even in a standard type-space, if the σ-algebra is not countably generated, then the set of states where a player is of a certain type might not be measurable.
The system is projective: If S
S then the marginal of P S i on S is P S i . (That is, if E ∈ Σ is an event whose base-space S (E) is lower or equal to S , then P S i (E) = P S i (E).) 2. Each probability measure P S i is a convex combination of i's beliefs in S: For every event E ∈ Σ such that S(E) S,
We call any probability measure µ i ∈ ∆(S) satisfying equation (1) in place of P S i a prior of player i on S.
Definition 4 (Common Prior) P = P S S∈S
∈ S∈S ∆(S) (resp. P S ∈ ∆ (S)) is a common prior (resp. a common prior on S) if P (resp. P S ) is a prior (resp. a prior on S) for every player i ∈ I.
Denote by [t i (ω)] := {ω ∈ Ω : t i (ω ) = t i (ω)}.
Definition 5 A common prior P = P
S S∈S
∈ S∈S ∆(S) (resp. a common prior P S on S) is positive if and only if for all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω: If t i (ω) ∈ (S ), for some S , then
Note that by Lemma 3 below, [t i (ω)] ∩ S ∈ F S .
Recall Remark 8 in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) according to which ifŜ is the upmost state-space in the lattice S, and (P S i ) S∈S ∈ S∈S ∆(S) is a tuple of probability measures, then (P S i ) S∈S is a prior for player i if and only if PŜ i is a prior for player i on S and P S i is the marginal of PŜ i for every S ∈ S. Definition 6 Let x 1 and x 2 be real numbers and v a continuous random variable on Ω. Define the sets E
We say that at ω, conditional on his information, player 1 (resp. player 2) believes that the expectation of v is weakly below x 1 (resp. weakly above x 2 ) if and only if ω ∈ E ≤x 1 1 (resp. ω ∈ E ≥x 2 1 ).
Theorem 1
Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure and P a positive common prior. Then there is no stateω ∈ Ω such that there are a continuous random variable v : Ω −→ R and x 1 , x 2 ∈ R, x 1 < x 2 , with the following property: atω it is common certainty that conditional on her information, player 1 believes that the expectation of v is weakly below x 1 and, conditional on his information, player 2 believes that the expectation of v is weakly above x 2 .
This general "No-trade" theorem implies our "No-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2009 ).
In Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we show by example that the converse of the "No-trade" theorem does not hold.
Proof of Theorem 1 4.1 Preliminary Definitions and Results
For i ∈ I, p ∈ [0, 1] and an event E, the p -belief operator is defined by
if there is a state ω such that t i (ω)(E) ≥ p, and by
otherwise. The mutual p-belief operator on events is defined by
The common certainty operator on events is defined by
These are standard definitions (e.g. see Monderer and Samet, 1989 ) adapted to our unawareness structures.
As in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) we define for every i ∈ I the awareness operator A i (E) := {ω ∈ Ω : t i (ω) ∈ ∆ (S) for some S S (E)} , for every event E, if there is a state ω such that t i (ω) ∈ ∆(S) with S S(E), and by
otherwise.
In Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 1 and 2) we show that
p (E), and CB 1 (E) are all S(E)-based events. We also show in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 9) that standard properties of belief obtain. Moreover, in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Proposition 3) we show "standard" properties of awareness. One of those properties is weak necessitation, i.e., for any event E ∈ Σ,
. This property will be used later in the proof.
Proposition 1 For every event F ∈ Σ:
(ii) There exists an evident event E such that ω ∈ E and E ⊆ B The proof is analogous to Proposition 3 in Monderer and Samet (1989) for a standard state-space and thus omitted.
We define G ⊆ Ω to be a measurable set if and only if for all S ∈ S, G ∩ S ∈ F S . The collection of measurable sets forms a sigma-algebra on Ω.
Let Ω be an unawareness belief structure. As in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009, Section 2.13), we define the flattened type-space associated with the unawareness belief structure Ω by
where Ω is the union of all state-spaces in the unawareness belief structure Ω, F is the collection of all measurable sets in Ω, and t
The definition of the belief operator as well as standard properties of belief and Proposition 1 can be extended to measurable subsets of Ω. The proofs are analogous and thus omitted.
Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure and P a positive common prior. For the proof of the theorem, we have to show that there is no evident measurable set E ∈ F such thatω ∈ E and
We need the following lemmata:
Lemma 1 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure, v : Ω −→ R be a continuous random variable, and x ∈ R. Then ω ∈ Ω : Ω v(·)d(t i (ω))(·) ≥ x and ω ∈ Ω : Ω v(·)d(t i (ω))(·) ≤ x are closed subsets of Ω.
6
Proof of the Lemma. Since for every S ∈ S, the topology on ∆(S) coincides with the weak * topology and since in particular, v : S −→ R is continuous,
By the continuity of t i : Ω −→ S∈S ∆(S), it follows that ω ∈ Ω : Ω v(·)d(t i (ω))(·) < x is open in Ω and hence it's relative complement with respect to Ω, ω ∈ Ω :
Lemma 2 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Let E be a closed subset of Ω. Then CB 1 (E) is a closed subset of Ω.
Proof of the Lemma. The relative complement of E with respect of Ω, Ω \ E, is open, and hence for every S ∈ S,
is open. Hence for every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω :
is open. It follows that it's relative complement with respect to Ω,
Since an arbitrary intersection of closed sets is closed, the Lemma follows by induction.
Lemma 3
Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Then for every ω ∈ Ω, every state-space S ∈ S and every player i ∈ I, the set {ω ∈ Ω :
Proof of the Lemma. Since ∆(S t i (ω) ) is the set of regular Borel probability measures on S t i (ω) endowed with the topology of weak convergence, {t i (ω)} is closed in ∆(S t i (ω) ), and hence {t i (ω)} is closed in S∈S ∆(S). Therefore, by continuity of t i , t
Lemma 4 Let Ω be a topological unawareness belief structure. Let P S be a positive (common) prior on the state-space S, and let ω ∈ S such that t i (ω) ∈ ∆(S). Then, for every E ∈ F S , we do have
The last equality follows from weak necessitation. We have -by the definition of a common prior -the following (with our abuse of notation): .
Proof of the Theorem
Suppose by contradiction, that there are x 1 , x 2 ∈ R with x 1 < x 2 and a continuous random variable v : Ω −→ R such that CB 1 (E Let S be a -minimal state-space with the property that S ∩ CB 1 (E )) for i = 1, 2. This implies that for each ω ∈ S ∩ CB 1 (E )) = 1, which by the minimality of S implies that t i (ω) ∈ ∆(S) and t i (ω)(S ∩ CB 1 (E ) with the induced structure, is a standard topological type-space (as in Heifetz, 2006) , since for each ω ∈ S ∩ CB 1 (E )) = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Since P S is a positive prior on S, we have that P S (S ∩ [t i (ω)]) > 0, for each ω ∈ S.
For ω ∈ S ∩CB 1 (E
